In an age of reform, Vietnam's financial systems have come to a critical stage in which the quality of policy-making, independence of the central banking operations and over-risk controls will ultimately be required if the country is set to move forward in a sustainable fashion. Analysts may have different views about Vietnam's financial economy, but all agree that it has evolved and grown fast over the past three decades. The next course of development will depend on how Vietnamese society views raison d'être of its financial systems and financial health. But the process will much depend on the economic growth of the economy as a whole. Failing to support a sustained growth puts VFS's existence at risk as economic growth helps mitigate higher risk-taking behavior and contain instability in less competitive markets. 
Introduction
Before the launch of extensive economic reforms, usually referred to as Doi Moi, Vietnam's economy was devastated by 30-year warfares with two world's military powers, France and the United States, ending in 1975. In the next 10 years Vietnam suffered from major failing economic experiments from 'cooperatization' in agriculture, "industry and commerce rehabilitation", price-wage-currency reform, etc. under the centrally planned mechanism (Wood 1989) , as well as the international isolation and U.S. trade embargo when its troops entered Cambodia to overthrow Khmer Rouge (Riedel & Turley 1999) . Worse off, a brief border war with China in 1979 led to suspended economic activities and a shortage of production materials in many years. Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita declined to US$97 in 1989 whereas External Debt/GDP reached 330% (Vuong 2010) . [1] The economy languished and became one of the poorest in the world.
Things have since changed. With a 92-million population, its GDP was US$204 billion in 2015, resulting in a GDP per capita of US$2,282 after 30 years of socioeconomic transitions, a remarkable achievement compared to US$437 in 1986 . Doi Moi has enabled the marketization/internationalization of the economy, bringing about the fruits of the market (Dutta 1995; Napier & Vuong 2013b; Riedel & Turley 1999; Vuong 2010) , with the financial system facilitating the transformation (Siregar 1997 ). The banking system had total assets of US$307 billion in 2015, approximately 150% of GDP.
A vibrant business sector is behind the growing financial sector. According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), 94,700 enterprises were created in 2015, registering an additional capital of US$27.3 billion. Nonetheless, some problems remain in both macro-policy realm and corporate sector's microstructure (Oh 1999; Riedel & Turley 1999; Pincus 2015) as in 2015, 80,900 enterprises dissolved or temporarily closed, 50% higher than that of 2011 ( Fig. 1) . Part of the reasons for business failures rests with the financial sector itself. In short, a well-functioning financial system is a sine qua non for Vietnam's sustained growth (Vuong 2016a ). 
Economic foundations and governance framework

Economic foundations
The restoring of economic stability laid out economic foundations for the development of the financial system, and its thriving forms of institution, growing asset and equity bases (Roman 1995; Oh 1999) . Success in fighting 1990s inflation rested with the management of exchange rate fluctuations combined with a restrictive monetary policy that contained broad money (M2) supply (Gourjon 2006) . In addition, the surge of economic activities has turned opportunities resulting from Doi Moi into positive GDP changes, for a growing population of Vietnam (Fig. 2) . In 2015, GDP per capita of US$2,282 made Vietnam a lower middle-income country. Households have more money to spend and invest as the domestic savings ratio remains high, approximately 30%. The improved savings rate, in turn, helps to counter future economic shocks (Sepehri & Akram-Lodhi 2005) . 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016(F) GDP (bn USD)
Foreign direct investments (FDI) also facilitated transformations with financial resources, technologies, markets, and new business methods. The stock of FDI-capital realizations by 2015 totaled approximately US$139 billion (Table 1) . The financial markets had been virtually inexistent before 1990 although money, bank deposits, loan transactions did exist. With VFS reforms this component economy has grown up fast (Román 1995; Vuong 2010) . Over time, VFS has been able to build up the national reserve that is regarded as "coussin-de-sécurité" against economic shocks that tend to occur frequently in an open emerging economy (see Fig. 3 ). Along the process of reforms, new regulations constitute the governance framework required for achieving VFS's strategic goals. The transition period has made this task of lawmaking and enforcement particularly challenging. There are different promulgators in Vietnam: the Politburo, National Assembly (NA), President, Government (Govt) and Prime Minister (PM), Ministries and ministerial-level agencies. Legal documents consist of resolution; laws; circular/decision/directive; and, decree. The regulatory framework that governs VFS has been built over the past ten years ( Table 2 ). The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) has issued a relatively large number of regulations. Documents listed in Table 3 are important for regulating a large spectrum of financial activities. Studying the history and contents of these regulations can help us learn a great deal about how the financial system has developed over the course of time.
Governance framework
The contemporary history
Important events of the history of VFS are summarized in Table 4 , starting the National Bank of Vietnam-the predecessor of SBV-established on May 6, 1951, following President Ho Chi Minh's Ordinance 15/SL to facilitate the rebuilding of the economy and preparing for the resistance war against the French troops. The main tasks of the NBV then were to (Vuong 2010 With Doi Moi and a two-tiered banking system, VFS has come into existence. Its early task was to fight late-1980s inflation. The battle was continuing well into the early 1990s. In the 2010s, once again inflation plagued the economy-see Fig. 4 -and the battle was resumed, making VFS's members constantly vigilant. 
Institutions-markets-instruments
Institutions
The transformation from a centrally planned model to a market-oriented economy faced numerous hurdles due to economic disorders, virtually zero savings, hyperinflation, and heavy reliance on money printing. Institutions building process in VFS took place in this period.
Most important types of financial institutions are presented in Fig Correlated with the pace of inflation and economic expansion, the process of monetizing Vietnam's economy started in the early 1990s, and accelerated mid-2000s, when the equity market boomed, leading broad money supply (M2) to surge (see Fig. 6 ), standing at US$267 billion at 2015 year-end. Sources: SBV, GSO, ADB, and author's estimates. [2] At the dawn of Doi Moi, 1986, total credit supply jumped by 1,897% compared to that of 1976, and by 326% of 1980. By the end of 1990, the total credit balance in the economy was 4,361% of the 1986 amount (or, 63,789% of the 1980 amount). Most counterinflation measures employed then were "situational reactions," not without negative consequences. Early adoption of the so-called monetary policy measures only arrived in 1991, having learned the market-based economic mechanism the hard way: slower money velocity could help weather hyperinflation, given certain economic conditions. A significant slowdown in credit growth then followed.
In the 1990s, this critically important task has been performed through a two-tiered banking system, with the State Bank of Vietnam in the command, and SOCBs/JSCBs playing the role of market performers. Credit growth went down to 70% in 1992, and then to 27.5% in 1999, helping to reduce inflation level of almost 400% in 1988, down to 67.5% (1991), then 17.5% (1992), and then 0.1% (1999). Table 5 shows a changing institution composition over time. Before PCFs, in 1990, about 300 credit cooperatives existed and mobilized a total amount of deposits worth US$100 million, offering high-interest rates to depositors (De Vylder & Fforde 1996) . With an underdeveloped legal framework and a serious lack of risk management skills/knowledge, many just danced with wild fluctuations of inflation and interest rates, and finally went bankrupt. Their chain collapsed pushed hundreds of thousands in financial distress, causing a first nationwide post-Doi Moi financial crisis. It took nearly two decades for VFS to restore the populace's confidence.
PCFs resemble the credit cooperatives regarding social traits, but with market principles and joint-stock ownership. PCFs are particularly suitable for delivering rural microfinance. At present, the system of PCFs collectively has total equity of US$140 million, and total assets US$3,545 million. NBFIs, inclusive of PCFs, accounted for 8% of the total assets of the financial system in 2011, estimated at 200% of GDP.
Markets and instruments
The banks, credit markets, and products:
The banking industry has been dominated by four SOCBs: Vietcombank, BIDV, VietinBank, and Agribank. They are largest regarding total equity and assets ( Fig. 7-8 ). The second 'family' consists of 31 JSCBs. Tier-1 JSCBs were founded during 1992-1993 with such names as ACB, Eximbank, Sacombank, VPBank, Techcombank... Also, during 1990 Also, during -1996 , SBV issued licenses for 20 rural areas commercial banks. In the next ten years, only four new firms were licensed. Following Dec. 1557/QD-NHNN by SBV Governor on Aug 9, 2006, these rural banks, if satisfying financial and operational conditions set out by the central bank, may be 'converted' to normal JSCBs, which would be allowed to conduct business in urban areas. Most of them formed the tier-2, although some moved up the value chain and managed to expand and become more creditworthy and sizable, such as HDBank.
In the late 1990s, many commercial banks, both rural and urban, performed poorly causing a great deal of risk for the economy and bad debts to skyrocket. SBV had to put a number of banks in "special supervision", a de facto state of the moratorium so that restructuring-M&A-dissolving operations could be performed without causing further damage to VFS. The number of commercial banks went down from 51 in 1997 to 39 in 2001.
After US-Vietnam BTA in 2001, and accession to WTO in 2007, Vietnam's banking market has opened to both FDI and FPI, leading to a surge in foreign banks' operation in the domestic market. Banks' profitability and investment efficiency have generally been considered modest, and showed some sign of decline in recent years, with ROEs in 2014 for SOCBs standing at 6.92%, JSCBs 4.64% and FOCBs 3.79%; and ROA: SOCBs 0.53%, JSCBs 0.40% and FOCBs 0.61%.
The development of the banking sector is correlated with the expansion of credit supply to the economy. The credit-to-GDP ratio was 71% in 2006, and 116% in 2010. On average, annual credit growth was 33% in the 2006-2010 period. In this period, both FDI and FPI inflows surged abruptly, adding a large amount of money to the economy. In 2007 alone, US$17.7 billion flowed in, leading to the central bank's net forex purchase of US$10.2 billion. Without being sterilized properly, M2 surged by 46% in the year, creating a tremendous inflation pressure. The credit growth rate slowed down to 18% in 2015 while both M2 and bank deposits expanded by around 14% in the same year. Banks also earn their incomes from forex operations. Fluctuations and increasing transaction volumes have created a lucrative market for commercial banks. Vietnamese individuals are allowed to keep foreign currency deposits (FCD), mostly USD, in their bank accounts and saving books. A higher FCD/M2 ratio reflects the 'dollarization' issue. This indicator for VFS varied from 5% during 1992-1996, to 19% (2000-2001) , 15% (2008-2009), 20% (2010), and to 15% (2011-2015) . Source: SBV; unit: million cards (except for ATM/POS).
Bank cards are now shifting to integrated-circuit card technology. Cards can help with payments for numerous types of bill (electricity, water, cable TV, phone, and online transactions). Quality and security of electronic banking have improved significantly since 2011. The above fact shows a tremendous development if one looks to the fact that by 2011, only 15% of adults had access to a debit card (Kalra 2015) . As seen in Fig. 13 , market size increased fast during 2006-2015, with 2015 year-end market capitalization standing at 33% of GDP. 
Securities broker firms:
The number of securities companies grew with VSM's size, as shown in Fig. 15 . Dozens of securities broker firm have made their fortune on VSM, especially those with strong equity (Table 10 ) and dominating market shares (Table 9 ). High inflation and restrictive monetary policy caused brokerage firms to make a substantial loss in 2011. In 2014, surviving firms were able to improve their performance, and their collective profits jumped to US$150 million. The sector's ROA and ROE were 5.15% and 8.58%, respectively in 2014, twice of those of 2010. By the end of 2015, only 81 survived the fierce competition who collectively held total assets of US$3,395.5 million and total equity of US$1,891 million. Among them, 20 largest made total revenues of US$345.5 million, and profits of US$131.8 million.
Insurers/Insurance markets:
Before Doi Moi, the insurance business had been monopolized by Bao Viet Insurance, an SOE established on 17/12/1964 offering two dozens of basic insurance needs. The reform came with Decree 100/CP (18/12/1993), which allowed private and foreign investors to participate in the business. The scope of activities also expanded, covering a wide range of previously inexistent activities.
The market boomed in 1995 when dozens of insurance firms and JVs were licensed. Additionally, 40 foreign insurers' representative offices and nearly 70,000 insurance agents were approved. Nowadays, 61 insurance and related service firms are fully operational in Vietnam, offering 800 different products meeting almost every consumer's need. It is also noteworthy that six life insurance businesses have been offering pension products-namely Manulife, AIA, Daiichi, PVI Sun Life, Bao Viet Life, and Prudential. Total assets of the insurance sector stood at US$8.78 billion in 2015, increasing by 12.68% from 2014, of which, nonlife subsector accounted for 31.8%, and life 68.2%. Insurance companies made investments into the economy, with 2015 total stock standing at US$6,383 million, 79.2% of which came from life insurers. Insurers have recently been the main buyers of government bonds, increasingly bonds with long maturities. In 2015, they bought 20-year government bonds worth US$283 million; a group of major insurers even proposed the government to issue 30-year bonds.
With over 200,000 registered agents, life insurance firms have been able to sell new policies during 2013-2015: 1,178,390; 1,252,157; 1,298,776 . Industry experts expect life insurance market will continue to expand by 25% in 2016, and nonlife insurance 18%. The number of agents increased during 2005-2015 from 35,000 to almost 70,000.
Financial companies:
First financial companies were licensed in 1997 to provide consumer finance and serve domestic trades. Their collective balance sheets showed an increase in shareholders' equity from US$520.8 million in 2012 to US$815.6 million in 2015, and total assets decreased from US$7.49 billion to US$4.04 billion. As non-deposit-taking firms, they are focused on nonbank services, especially riskier consumer goods financing. In the 2014-2016 period, they financed about 20% of consumer goods purchases nationwide, with interest margins typically running from 25-30% p.a., twice of the normal bank rates. Several pioneers are now exploring personal wealth management services in the context of increasing risks due to higher unpredictability of profits of financial assets such as gold, forex or equity stocks, whereas the number of Vietnamese super-rich is expected to grow fast over the next ten years.
Financial leasing:
Six first financial lessors appeared in the mid-1990s, providing small-scaled termfinance alternatives to private SMEs, who then suffered from discriminatory lending by SOCBs. Banks also established their wholly-owned financial leasing subsidiaries, as lessors could be more flexible regarding decision-making. From 2000, the government raised the bar for new entrants, requiring an equity minimum of US$5 million. Lessors also entered a race in equity. Thus their equity base increased to US$70.5 million in 2005, and then US$136.4 million in 2007, even though all lessors generated a mediocre NPAT of US$4.73 million (ROE~3.5%).
In the post-WTO period, lessors performed poorly, with profit margins declining over time. Flexible contract terms at times became dangerous as executives manipulated regulations and made financing decisions for personal profiteering, especially at SOCBfounded lessors such as the case of Vu Quoc Hao-former CEO of Agribank Leasing Co. As there exist different types of investment funds operating and holding equity assets in VSM, it is impossible to track all data on investments, portfolio values, and funds' performance. But the authorities-SSC and HOSE/HNX-can monitor local ETFs, such as VFMVN30.
Bond markets:
From 2005, VSM has also served as a major distribution system of government bonds, organizing public auctions. The government borrowed from public bonds investors approximately US$48 billion in the 2010-2015 period, mostly 3-and 5-year terms (see Appendixes A2-A3). In 2011, the bond market was worth 15% GDP, with >90% being government bonds. The total value of outstanding government bonds is now estimated 22% of GDP. Thus bonds have become a major source for financing state budget deficit. Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 While the government bond market has been picking up since 2005, the corporate bond market remains quite modest. The corporate bond is the game where few large corporations-banks included-dominate and seek to tap public sources of debt finance. M&A transactions have since made a multi-billion-dollar market with hundreds of completed deals each year as more firms wanted to acquire assets, brands or accesses to emerging lucrative market segments (Vuong, Napier & Samson 2014) .
Larger M&A deals appeared in 2013 with Warburg Pincus's acquiring 20% of Vincom Retail and KKR's US$400 million purchase of Masan's equity. The market peaked in 2012 and 2015, with total value each year standing at US$4.2 billion, counting 367 and 525 deals, respectively. M&As among domestic firms was increasing during 2008-2012, from 22% to 45% of the market. Acquiring firms from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the U.S. dominate the market. 
Banking-finance-economic growth
Interconnectedness
The relationship between financial markets and long-term economic growth has been rich in the literature. Empirical results suggest that well-functioning system contributes to economic growth by amassing financial resources and allocating them to sectors that can use them productively (Leung 2009; . Financial markets can also provide tools and signals that help monitor the economy's efficiency and changing risks, and redirect resources under specific economic mechanisms. The financial tools are also behind a great number of techniques and paradigms for bettering corporate governance and promoting trade.
Financials guide firms' behavior based on their opportunity of accessing an external source of finance (O'Toole & Newman 2012) . Better access to finance, associated with a reasonable cost of funds, would likely reduce both operating and opportunity costs of firms, and hence improve business outcome. Technology transfer also requires the smooth functioning of the financial system. If this occurs in society in large scale, well-functioning financial markets will contribute to long-term economic growth; Credit/GDP and M2/GDP increases show some positive effect on Vietnam's growth in the 1997-2006 period (Anwar & Nguyen 2009) . Also, FDI efficiency shows some evidence of reliance on the efficiency of the financial markets. Thus financial factor has both direct and indirect effects on economic growth of Vietnam.
Vietnam's leadership now considers steps of liberalizing the financial system, giving more freedom to market players. Although the government's interventions are still unavoidable sometimes, they are now used more cautiously, and policymaking tends to be increasingly evidence-based. Increases in M2 induce increasing outputs through thanks to reduced costs and more investments in the productive sector as Hung & Pfau (2009) provide evidence that money shock is responsible for as little as 0.64% of shock in prices, but for over 44% of real output increase in the short run. But as both the capacity of absorbing money and the technical efficiency by productive sector are bounded, too much finance by later decrease economic efficiency . Passing some thresholds of size/growth, the financial sector tends to compete with the rest of the economy for resources and its enlargement is no longer growth-enhancing (Nguyen, Le & Freeman 2006; Cecchetti & Kharroubi 2012) .
In addition, with the existence of stock markets, integration into the world economy increases interdependency among capital markets and contagion risks. There is evidence that VSM has been influenced by American, Chinese and Japanese stock markets, of which risks spillover from the Japanese stock market was found to be the strongest (Wang & Lai 2011) . Also, argue that the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam during the higher inflation period was generally 'clumsy'. Management of foreign exchange fluctuations has been a burden on SBV/SOCBs, limiting the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. Financial sector liberalization helps promote not only growth but also macroeconomic stability.
Inclusive financing: microfinance-venture capital-crowdfunding
Microfinance:
Jobs creation has been a major economic achievement. From the mid-1990s, most jobs have been created by the private SMEs. The problem with the SMEs subsector has been a constant lack of access to financing and unequal playing field where they are subjected to higher costs of fund and operations (O'Toole & Newman 2012; Yoshino & TaghizadehHesary 2014) . Kalra (2015) reports only 8% of Vietnamese saved money and 16% had a loan with a financial institution in 2011.
In a context that 30% of adults borrowed from friends/family and that among the poorest income quintile in Vietnam, only 6% had access to formal financial services (Kalra 2015) , seeking microfinance is perhaps a logical consequence. Microfinance has now been one of the important solutions and a sign of financial market liberalization, although evidence on positive effects of microfinance has been mixed (IFC 2014) . The presence of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and microfinance activities can be traced back to 1980s under various formal and informal types of financing such as credit cooperatives, 'Hui' or small group's alternate borrowings. By mid-1996, 674 people's credit funds collectively gathered about 275,000 members, mobilizing US$48 million funds and lending out US$67mn (Fallavier 1998) .
However, the concept of formal microfinance appeared in the early 1990s, and its credit-based schemes were first implemented under donor-funded programs. Microcredit has usually been associated with inherent services such as access to saving facilities and provision of basic insurance (Vuong 2010) . Nonetheless, the commercial viability of MFIs has always been a question due largely: i) relatively high administrative costs; ii) riskier due to lack of management resources and standard governance; iii) lack of collaterals by borrowers, leading to a propensity to increase interest rates.
Hainz, Dinh & Kleimeier (2011) present evidence that richer credit borrowers tend to succeed in securing larger loan amounts, reducing 'friction' and paying lower costs of the fund while access to fast-improving banking infrastructure is still limited within the uppermiddle-income class, mainly residents of major cities. According to IFC (2014) only 16.5% of the adults in rural areas, and 29.8% of adults in urban areas have an account at a formal financial institution as of 2011, whereas the averages for the East Asia & Pacific developing region are 50.1% and 68.7%, respectively.
Although still limited in scale, improvements of MFI activities can be seen with more recent statistics. The three major domestic systems that are partly responsible for microfinance activities, namely VBSP, VBARD, PCFs collectively served 9.6 million clients by the end of 2013, providing a total amount of credit worth US$8,034 million. While it is still not easy to learn about genuine microcredit portion of this portfolio, by the end of 2012, genuine MFIs (exclusive of VBSP/VBARD/PCFs) provided US$108 million microcredit to 480,000 clients (IFC 2014) . This cause of sustainable development-supported by multilateral organizations-also leads to microfinance initiatives such as ADB-managed US$40mn ADF program in conjunction with the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction's technical assistance. [2] Venture capital financing:
Due to the predominant credit-based financing agenda by the Vietnamese government, venture-capital activities had a slow start in the 1990s, and Vietnam's entrepreneurial financing initiatives have significantly diverged from international venturecapital policy patterns (Klingler-Vidra 2014 In 2015, the government also explored the opportunity of setting up a VCF to support newborn ecosystem for tech-related entrepreneurs, with assistance from statefinanced sci-tech supports agencies such as NAFOSTED/NATIF/NATEC, Vietnam Startup Fund, and Vietnam Silicon Valley Project. Still, there is a lack of local funds so that earlystage tech startups are underfinanced. The government and its research institutes believe a national VCF will be a prime solution, helping nurture this critically important component of the entrepreneurship ecosystem with seed funding.
In March 2016, 500-Startups announced its plan to set up a US$10 million VCF focused on Vietnam-connected startups. The typical investment in a startup venture runs from US$100,000 to 250,000. Apart from the finance, the fund intends to support startups with their international network of 3,000 mentors and founders, and credit facilities with such partners as Amazon and Facebook.
Still, the venture-capital industry remains modest and underdeveloped despite a batch of emerging VCFs that have come into existence since the 2000s (Klingler-Vidra 2014).
Crowdfunding:
This financing mechanism has become a buzzword over the recent years when entrepreneurship programs seek to find alternative finances for entrepreneurs' creative, yet risky, ideas (Vuong 2016a (Vuong , 2016b . The AEC is expected to attain US$8 billion market for crowdfunding in the latter half of the 2010s when the world's crowdfunding industry reaches US$96 billion in size. It was heard of for the first time in Vietnam in 2012, but the legal framework for governing crowdfunding operations has not been in place leading to higher perceived risks. Vietnam's finally got the first ever crowdfunding platform IG9 in mid-2013.
Most crowdfunding activities center around a handful of Internet-based platforms: ig9.vn, fundstart.vn, 500.co, inspireventures.com, cyberagentventures.com... Despite its novelty, local entrepreneurs are receptive to crowdfunding and on steep learning curves. By 2016, this entrepreneurial finance concept has become somewhat familiar, offering key values of:
• Increasing awareness and helping to build trust gradually; • Getting around strict collateral requirements; • Testing if new projects are perceived as well by the larger community;
• Facilitating the communications and connecting startups to different circles in society.
The crowdfunding industry has still been nascent, but it appears that with the fast increasing entrepreneurship community and receptive entrepreneurs, Vietnam would likely become the second country in ASEAN-after Malaysia-to institutionalize a crowdfunding framework with a development roadmap.
Inherent risks and challenges
VFS's bank-based nature induces inherent risks of structural problems as, at present, total banking assets-SPBs included-amount to 180% of GDP, and >92% of VFS's assets. Additionally, during 2005-2010, state institutions increased holdings in SOCBs/JSCBs from VND 1 trillion to 15 trillion without facing any regulatory restrictions (Pincus 2015) , although inefficiencies of state-owned non-core investments had been well-informed. Meanwhile, the inflation problem remains, making the system even more vulnerable to economic shocks (Vuong 2010; Nguyen, Cavoli & Wilson 2012; Kalra 2015) .
Too much power of the financial sector also likely leads to the situation where financial institutions compete with productive sectors for resources, increasing the risk of misallocation (Stiglitz 2016) . Addiction to financial resource is also real. In addition, resource without innovative capacity and value-added activities by companies becomes a drag on the corporate sector-a kind of financial "resource curse"-through destructive creation of resource-rich, uninnovative and rent-seeking quasi-business organizations . Rampant practices of directed lending and relationship-based credit granting further add to the increased risk of financial failures, or worse off, financial frauds (Vuong, Napier & Tran 2013; Vuong 2016a,b) .
Use of credit in Vietnam has generally been regarded as inefficient. The real estate market consumed 80% of credit supply in 2013, crowding out other productive sectors of the economy. More recently, government's economic stimulus package in 2008 induced risk-taking behaviors and arbitrage opportunities holders of speculative assets, potentially causing risks of overinflating bubbles in real estate and financial assets markets (Dinh, Malesky, To & Nguyen 2013) . The risk of misallocation of finance increased substantially in the context that only 20% of finance for entrepreneurs/SMEs was informal, pushing costs of the fund to 3-6 times of the formal banking rates (Thanh, Cuong, Dung & Chieu 2011) . This is a serious issue for the Vietnamese economy in general (O'Toole & Newman 2012). Selfish commercial interests tend to entice banks-currently under interest controls-to protect their margins by transferring operational costs to customers (Pham 2015) . The banking sector also encountered numerous scandals that led to jail terms for many senior bankers (Table 16 provides some examples). The creation of VAMC and its questionable credibility show how serious the problem of bad debts is. Without an essential solution, this deeply rooted problem would further increase risk appetite by the rich firms, especially those in speculative assets markets. Needless to say, the information asymmetry problem, nested in banks' cross-holding of banks' equity, would make the risk skyrocket (Pincus, 2015) .
Facing these issues, recent positive signs of the banking system such as a lower Lending-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR) of around 80% during 2014-2016, and positive growth rate of deposits at banks may serve as the system's pain reliever for some time. However, the signs may, unfortunately, reflect the truth of a lower capacity to consume finance within the productive sector and society's liquidity preference, even though interest-earning capacity decreases. Fig. 24 shows that over the past decades, commercial lending rates in Vietnam have been constantly high, rarely below 10% p.a. Among banks, their interbank borrowings show wildly-fluctuating costs of the fund. And, each short period of lower costs of the fund was followed by a longer period with rate jumps (Fig. 26) , evidence of liquidity-crunch and ALMrisk amplification. This phenomenon is a real threat to any large and long-term project as it makes financial calculations uncertain and risky. With the AEC coming into existence from December 31, 2015, new challenges also arrive. By 2015, ASEAN enterprises have registered a total FDI-capita stock of US$57 billion (2,700 projects), surpassing South Korea (US$45 billion/4,020 projects), Japan (US$38 billion/2,700 projects). Regional players are taking up the opportunity to strengthen their standing in VFS (Skully & Perera 2012) . A typical example is Public Bank Berhad's swift move to close its 20-year-old VID Public Bank JV with BIDV to establish its locally-registered wholly-owned banking entity. That augurs for a coming competition, whose complexities and fierceness may not be fully appreciated by domestic FIs (Vuong 2016a ).
on VFS itself (Leung 2009; Nguyen & Nguyen 2009; Vuong 2010; Tra & Riedel 2012) . Renewed reforms of the governance system based on rules of law and arm's-length transactions principle will have to be institutionalized (Malesky & Taussig 2009; Bhattacharya 2014; Pincus 2015) . That means a departure from the existing systemprimarily based on personal relationships, cronyism, and unchecked commercial interestswith cross-holdings of banks' equity as a manifestation (Sarath & Pham 2015) .
#2: The clumsiness of local monetary policy in troubled times (Tra & Riedel 2012 ) is related to the complexity, and most probably the impossibility, of its multi-objective macro decision-making framework, thus a reform need is well beyond just fixing the "clumsy policy behavior" (Nguyen & Nguyen 2009; Nguyen, Cavoli & Wilson 2012; Kalra 2015) . The two bouts of 2-digit inflation during 2008-2012 remind policymakers of the "impossible trinity" doctrine, in several variants (Das 2006; Grenville 2011) .
The concept "reforming the reform" may be particularly useful as Vietnam's transitions would shortly enter unchartered waters of the unprecedented pace of regionalization and globalization (Stiglitz 2016) . While complications and uncertainties prevail, the sociocultural system with its well-built mindset finds them uncomfortable to cope with (Yu 2008; Vuong & Napier 2015; Vuong, Vu, and Vuong 2016.) . Public debts reaching the dangerous limit, vulnerable financial system, constantly constrained budgets coupled with large deficits will certainly put Vietnamese leadership at a serious stress test, where the dichotomy of policy choice is as simple as: a) moving forward with reformist political economy principles; or, b) moving backward to stricter control for the illusion of independence and autonomy bearing the immeasurable cost of foregone opportunities (Kokko 1998; Presbitero 2008; Volz 2013) .
#3: The weaknesses that prevent the economy from attaining its optimal balance between growth and sustainability include: a) inadequate speed of institutional reforms, macro institutions and entrepreneurial ecosystem included; and, b) the lack of an autonomous central bank with effective policy-making and efficient set of policy implementation tools, which has the skills, rules, resources, and capabilities of balancing between stability-oriented interventions and profitable risk-taking (Carmen 2006; Kraay & Nehru 2006; Leung 2009; Volz 2013 ).
In the age of indebtedness and deficits, SBV's relative independence will even be more critical as compromising on the quality of policy-making will ultimately lead to uncontrollable risks and failures to plan even in the short run. As the monetary and capital markets have already been strongly connected and very sensitive even to a vague sign of failures (Bellocq & Silve 2008) , monetary policy quality will have far-reaching effectspositive or negative-on the whole economy and its future. Toward such a reform, the value of increasing central bank's autonomy should ultimately be for public interests and national sustainable prosperity (Stiglitz 2016) .
Analysts may have different views about Vietnam's financial economy, but all agree that it has evolved and grown fast over the past three decades in transition. The next course of development will depend on how Vietnamese society views raison d'être of VFS. Failure to support a sustained growth puts VFS's existence at risk as economic growth helps mitigate 43 A3. 3-Year government bond issues 60,000
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